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THE STANDARD OF CARE
IN MALPRACTICE CASES
IRVIN SHERMAN

Medical malpractice has been a controversial issue both in the
press and in medical and legal circles in recent years. As a result, the
public in general and the medical profession in particular have become
increasingly aware of the professional conduct of doctors. In California, "malpractice actions have become so prevalent that on the average
one out of every four doctors is sued at some time for malpractice". 1
The situation is not quite as serious in Canada. In 1965, the
Canadian Medical Protective Association which represents 78%
(15,500 out of 22,000) of Canadian doctors handled just 27 cases involving malpractice. 2
It has been stated that, "the practising physician or surgeon is
an easy target for the blackmailer. The disgruntled or unscrupulous
patient can inevitably destroy the reputation of the most eminent
physician or surgeon by an ill-founded action for malpractice." 3 The
adverse publicity atributable to a medical negligence case, regardless
how unfounded the action may be, can only have a detrimental effect
upon the doctor's career, thus weakening the vital role he can play
in contributing to the needs of society. It is therefore of the utmost
importance that the law does not act to the prejudice of doctors or
their patients.
This paper will attempt to evaluate the standard of care the law
imposes upon doctors. It is a breach of this standard, which in certain
circumstances will render a doctor liable for malpractice. Special
reference will be paid to the Canadian position and, where possible,
to the Ontario position in particular.
Standard of Care
The standard of care is a legal measuring rod imposed by the
courts to which the doctor's conduct must conform if he is to escape
liability for malpractice or negligence. In other words, the courts
evaluate the doctor's conduct according to a standard established by
the law. The doctor's conduct is then assessed by weighing the evidence or facts of each case against this standard. The trial judge
(malpractice actions in Ontario are tried before a judge without a
jury) will find for the patient if the doctor failed to live up to the
standard imposed upon him.
*Irvin Sherman, B.A. (Dalhousie), LL.B. (Osgoode), is a member of the 1966
graduating class.
1 Province of Ontario, "Report of the Attorney-General's Committee on
Medical Evidence In Court in Civil Cases", 1965, p. 80.
2 Letter from the Canadian Medical Protective Association to writer.

3 Supra, footnote 1, p. 83.
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The first reported malpractice suit was Hills case 4 in 1374. In
that case the court said "if the surgeon had done as well as he was
able and had employed all his diligence in administering to the patent,
it is not right he should be found culpable". As the law of negligence
developed, this subjective standard of care was replaced by the objective standard of the reasonable man which states that:
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man
guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct
of human affairs, would do, or something which a prudent or reasonable
man would not do. The defendants might have been liable for negligence,
if, unintentionally, they omitted to do that which a reasonable person
would have done, or did that which a person taking reasonable precautions would not have done.5
For professional men, the courts have slightly modified this standard
to the objective standard of a reasonable member of that profession
or calling.
The jury [judge] should not exact the highest or a very high standard
nor should they be content with a very low standard.6 The law requires
a fair and reasonable standard of care and competence.
To say that a doctor violated the standard of care is not of itself
sufficient to establish his liability for negligence. Before the standard
applies there must have been a legal duty on the part of the doctor
towards his patient to exercise skill and care. This duty arises as a
matter of law when the doctor agrees to take the case and it is
independent of contract. It is also necessary that the loss or injury
to the patient be directly attributable to the negligent conduct of the
doctor. In other words, there must be a causal connection between
the doctor's conduct and the patient's loss.7 It is clear that the prior
negligent conduct of a third party which resulted in injury to the
patient will not preclude the patient from recovering from his doctor,
if in treating the patient the doctor acted negligently. 8 It is essential
that the patient's conduct be assessed for if it is shown that the patient
is the author of his own misfortune, he will be precluded from recovering.9 If the patient is not entirely at fault, but only partially so, his
recovery will be diminished by the extent of his fault. 10
In assessing the professional standard of care, regard must be had
to:
(a) the risk involved. Lord Nathan has pointed out that "the
degree of care required varies in proportion to the magnitude of the
risk.... More extensive precautions must be taken where treatment
which involves known risks is administered than where no such risk
can be reasonably anticipated.""
4 48 Edw. III, f. 6, p. 11.
5 Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks (1859), 11 Ex. 781, per Baron Alderson, at p. 784.
6 1. v. Bateman (1925), 94 L.J.K.B. 791, per Lord Hewart C.J., at p. 794.
7 See Hutchinson v. Robert, [1935] O.W.N. 314 (Ont. C.A.).
8 Mercer v. Gray, [1941] O.R. 127 (Ont. C.A.).
9 Nykiforuk v. Lockwood, [1941] 1 W.W.R. 327 (Sask. Dist. Ct.).
10 The Negligence Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 261, s. 4.
11 Lord Nathan, Medical Negligence (1957), p. 24.
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(b) the known characteristics of the party exposed to the risk.
(c) necessity. The standard imposed upon a doctor acting in an
emergency will not be the same as if he had time to reflect. 12 "What
would be ordinary 13care in one set of circumstances would be negligence in another."
(d) the physical circumstances of every case. Factors to be
considered include the distance from a doctor's office or a hospital and
the availability of equipment. For example, in Whitehead v. Hunter
it was held that:
Where it is alleged that a complaint could have been successfully diagnosed by the use of a particular apparatus or appliance, regard must be
had to the availability of that apparatus or appliance in the particular
14
case in order to decide whether failure to use it amounts to negligence.
Thus it should be seen that "though there is only one standard of
care the actual degree of care required is infinitely varied". 15
The objective standard of reasonableness is often proved by
showing that the dcctor has allowed the customary procedures established by his profession. Indeed, it has been stated that:
in
medical malpractice cases failure to establish non-conformity is
fatal to the [patient] and the [doctor] who established conformity is

entitled to a directed verdict.16

One American writer goes so far as to state that:
Custom is not conclusive of the care to be taken, but when we examine
cases of medical negligence, however, we find that custom does become,
almost exclusively, the measure of care.1 7

Adherence to custom is relevant in weighing or assessing the
doctor's conduct with that of the norm. Custom determines the precautions to be taken. If the court found a doctor liable for adhering
to the practices of his professional brethren, the result would be
disastrous. The standard of care would then become arbitrary and
shifting, being either too high or too low. What would be negligent
in one set of circumstances would not be negligent in another.
The court distinguishes between issues which are matters of
professional competence and issues which are within the common

knowledge of laymen (for example, counting sponges). In the latter
case, the court adopts the objective standard of the reasonable man
which has the effect of lowering the burden of proof. 18 Nor will the
court permit doctors to rely on expert evidence and custom, where
12 Wilson V. Swanson, [1956] S.C.R. 804, see Rand J., at pp. 811-812;
Waldon v. Archer (1921), 20 O.W.N. 77.
13 Houghston v. Jost, [1943] O.W.N. 3, per Hope J., at p. 4.
14 (1950), 94 Sol. J. 758, quoted by Lord Nathan, op. cit., footnote 11, at
p. 23.

15
16

James, General Principles of the Law of Torts (1959), p. 147.

C. Morris, Custom and Negligence (1942), 42 Col. L.R. 1147, at p. 1163.

17 A. H. McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners (1959) 12
Vand. L.R. 549, at p. 606.
18 Taylor v. Gray (1937), 11 M.P.R. 588 (N.B.S.C.); Anderson V. Chasney,
[1950] 4 D.L.R. 233 (S.C.C.).
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professional procedure fails to make provision for obvious risks. The
reason is that if a profession adopts careless procedures, a member of
that profession will not be relieved of liability if he follows a careless
procedure. For example, where an operating room explosion which
injured the patient, was attributable to oxygen cylinders being improperly located, the court refused to accept customary practice in
other hospitals as a defence, as such practices were found to be
negligent.1 9
The Canadian courts have applied the standard of care as defined
by the English courts.20 In the leading case of Lanpkier v. Phipos,2'
Tindal C.J. defined the standard thus:
Every person who enters into a learned profession undertakes to bring
to the exercise of it a reasonable degree of care and skill. He does not
undertake, if he is an attorney, that at all events you shall gain your case,
nor does a surgeon undertake to use the highest degree of skill. There
may be persons who have greater education and greater advantage than
he has, but he undertakes to bring a fair, reasonable, and competent
degree of skill ....
This statement of the law has been referred to by the Ontario Court
of Appeal as the classical statement in the law as to malpractice. 22
Implicit in this definition is that a "medical man does not in point
of law guarantee the recovery of his patient." 23 The doctor just
promises to use reasonable skill and care. This standard will be applied
whether the doctor acted gratuitously or not, for the doctor held himself out to possess such skill and knowledge, and it was his duty to
act reasonably after he accepted the responsibility.24A doctor need not follow the procedures adopted by a unanimous
majority of doctors. If a doctor follows a procedure adopted by a
reputable minority of practitioners, it will suffice to disprove any
inference of negligence. This principle has been expounded by the
Ontario courts since 1878.25 More recently it was applied in the case
of Davy v. Morrison2 6 where Riddell J. A. said:

In this the only specific evidence concerning the operation it is stated
that the method pursued is an established practice but that some surgeons
do not approve of it. This is not enough to establish malpractice.
19 Sylvester v. Grits, [1956] S.C.R. 991; see also Holt v. Nesbitt, [1953] 1
S.C.R. 143.

20 Dangerfield v. David (1910), 17 W.W.R. 249; Turriff v. Wilson (1913),
3 W.W.R. 862; Stamper v. Rhindress (1906), 41 N.S.R. 45; Town v. Archer
(1902), 4 O.L.R. 383; Pankin v. Kobrinsky (1963), 46 W.W.R. 193 (Man. C.A.);

James v. Crockett (1898), 34 N.B.R. 542; Wilson v. Swanson, supra, footnote
12; Clark v. Wansbrough, [1940] O.W.N. 66; Hampton v. MacAdam, [1912]
22 W.L.R. 31; Crysler v. Pearse, [1943] O.R. 735; Houghston v. Jost, supra,
footnote 13; R. v. Giardine (1939), 71 C.C.C. 295; Jarvis v. InternationalNickel
Co. Ltd. (1929), 63 O.L.R. 564.
21 (1838), 8 C. & P. 475, at p. 479, 173 E.R. 581; see also Rich v. Pierpoint,
3 F. & F. 35, 176 E.R. 16.
22 Sweetman v. Law (1925), 28 O.W.N. 62, affd. 28 O.W.N. 433, per Latchford C.J.
23 James v. Crockett, supra, footnote 20, per Tuck C.J., at p. 542.
24 Crysler v. Pearse, supra, footnote 20, per Paxton J., at p. 743; see also
Challand v. Bell (1959), 27 W.W.R. 182, per Riley J., at p. 188 (Alta. C.A.).
25 Fields v. Rutherford (1878), 29 U.C.C.P. 112.
26

[1932] O.R. 1, at p. 8.
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To upset the facts as found by the trial judge, the appellate court
must not merely entertain doubts whether the decision below is right
but be convinced that it is wrong.27
As the plaintiff (usually the patient) bears the onus of proving
negligence, it is not difficult to understand why the courts have said
that
...in law if a physician or surgeon was properly qualified . . .28 the
is shown, that he was competent
presumption was, until the contrary
and the treatment was correct.29

Locality Rule
The American definition of the standard of care has been defined
as "the reasonable or ordinary degree of skill and learning commonly
possessed and exercised by members of the profession who are of the
same school and who practice in same or similiar localities." 30 This is
similar to the Anglo-Canadian definition except that the American
case law places additional emphasis upon the practice or custom followed by doctors of a particular geographical area. This additional
qualification was added to protect the country physician who usually
lacked the opportunity to acquire wide experience and knowledge.
Professor Fleming states that this qualification was introduced to
protect the medical profession "against the blackmailing tactics to
which it is so particularly vulnerable." 31
Non-acceptance of the "locality" rule by our courts may be
attributable in part to the fact that there "is less pressure for
techniques to protect the medical man against spurious claims, due
partly to the disappearance of juries." 32 Furthermore, the Canadian
Medical Council was formed by Federal statute33 to ensure uniform
qualifications for all practitioners regardless in what part of Canada
they practice. Examinations called "Dominion Councils" set by the
Council, are written each year by medical students in their last year
of studies. These examinations help set uniform standards throughout
Canada.
It appears however that the American courts are beginning to
"widen" the locality rule. In fact, the rule has been called an "anachronism". 34 Judicial disapproval for such a rule may be found by
examining the Ontario case of Toum v. ArCher where Falconbridge
C.J. stated:
27 Gray v. Caldeira, [1936] 1 W.W.R. 615 (P.C.), per Lord Alness, at p.
681, quoting Wright L.J. in Powell v. Streatham Manor Nursing Home, [1935]
A.C. 243.
28 See The Medical Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 234.
29 Walker v. Bedard and Snelling, [1945] O.W.N. 120, per LeBel J., at p.

124.

A similar presumption exists for dentists, see MoTaggart et al. v. Peters,

[1926] 3 W.W.R. 513.

30 A. H. McCoid, op. cit., supra, footnote 17.

31 Fleming, Developments in the English Law of Medical Liability (1959),
12 V. and L.R. 633, at p. 640.
32 Ibid.

33 Canada Medical Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 27.
34 J. G. Fleming, op. cit., supra,footnote 31.
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•.. [A)l men practising in a given locality might be equally ignorant and
behind the times and regard must be had to the present advanced state
of the profession and to the easy means of communication
with and
access to the large centres of education and science. 35
This reasoning seems to offer sufficient justification for the exclusion

of the locality rule from our jurisprudence. In fact, in Taylor v.
Gray,3 6 six doctors who attended six different medical schools in six
different provinces or states gave evidence at trial.

There is a diversity of opinion as to whether the standard of care
expected of a rural practitioner should be similar to that expected of

urban practitioners.
The late Dean W. G. J. Meredith of the McGill University Law
School stated:
• . . [A] physician or surgeon practising in a country village should not
ordinarily be held to the same standard
of proficiency as physicians or
surgeons practising in a big city.37
On the other hand, Lord Nathan adopts the view of the South
African court in Van Wyk v. Lewis where it was stated:
The ordinary medical practitioner should . . . exercise the same degree
of skill and care whether he carries on his work in the town or country,
in one place or another.38
Modern means of communication and travel have destroyed the

defence that rural doctors need protection because their comparative
isolation prohibits their ability to keep abreast of current medical

knowledge. As Professor Fleming states, "it is... a matter of grave
concern whether the law should lightly abandon its role of actuating
' 39
constant improvements of professional standards.
It is therefore submitted that the standard of care expected of a
rural doctor should be the same as that of an urban doctor. In assessing the standard, regard must be had to the particular circumstances
of every case. The standard of care remains the same in each case
but the degree of skill and care required to comply with that standard

is conditioned by the circumstances. This approach was adopted by
the court in Zinkier v. Robertson4o where it was stated:

It surely cannot be that the skill of a physician attending a patient in a
private house [in a rural area] with few conveniences and no assistants,
is to be measured by the same standard as a city surgeon, provided with
an operating room, nurses and all the aids of a modern hospital.
35 (1902), 4 O.L.R. 383, at p. 388.
36 Supra, footnote 18.
37 Meredith, Malpractice Liability for Doctors and Hospitals (1956), p. 63;
see also Turriff v. Wilson, supra, footnote 20; Town 'v. Archer, supra, footnote
20.
38 [1924] App. D. 438, per Innes J., as quoted by Lord Nathan, op. cit.,
supra, footnote 11, p. 21.
39 Fleming, op. cit., footnote 31, p. 641.
40 (1897), 30 N.S.R. 61, at p. 70.
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The courts have also considered such factors as the availability of
office and
equipment 4' in a rural area, the distande between a doctor's
42
his patient's home and the condition of rural roads.
Other Health Professions
Medical doctors are not the only professional group whose object
is to diagnose and treat human ailments. Similar objects are professed
by such schools as chiropracty, chiropody, optometry and osteopathy.
Generally speaking, the standard of care expected of a member of a
"particular school" is the objective standard of a reasonable practitioner of that school according to the circumstances of each case. 43 The
standard appears to be similar in Canada and the United States.
An exception will be found where the particular school does not
demand uniformity of practice of its members. For example, in Nelson
44 evidence of the customary practice of a spiritualist
v. Harrington
or clairvoyant physician was not accepted by the court as the members
of that school treat their patients by means of a trance and no uniform standard of procedure was possible.
The law does not favour any particular school or system of
medicine. Therefore, evidence given by a member of a different school
which disapproves of the treatment rendered will not be accepted
by the court as proof of negligence. 45 However, where a member of
a particular school of medicine uses a piece of equipment not common
to any particular school (for example, an X-ray machine) the standard
of care expected of such a person is that of the "ordinary standard of
a competent manipulator" for such equipment is available for all
schools and for all purposes. 46 Furthermore, evidence tendered by a
member of a different school will be accepted by the court where such
evidence tends to show negligence in diagnosis. The courts distinguish
between diagnosis and treatment for there can be disagreement among
schools of medicine as to the proper course of treatment but "diagnosis is the process of discovering what is actually in real truth the
exact physical nature of the trouble. Here there cannot be any question of different schools of opinion."47
What assurance does a patient have that the objective standard of
care attributable to a particular school of medicine is not arbitrary
or too low? Lord Nathan submits that the school of medicine must
be widely recognized as such before it is entitled to be judged by its
own standards. Licensing statutes 48 regulate the qualifications and
Whiteford v. Hunter,supra, footnote 14.
42 Rickley 'v. Stratton (1912), 22 O.W.R.282.; Fawcett 'v. Mothersell (1864),
14 U.C.C.P. 104.
43 For the standard of care required of Chiropractors in Canada, see
Gibbons v. Harris, [1924] 1 W.W.R. 674; Cawley v. Mercer, [1945] 3 W.W.R.
41; Pennerv. Theobald, [1962] 40 W.W.R.217.
41

44
45
46
47
48

(1888), 72 Wis. 591, 40 N.W.288.

Penner v. Theobald, supra,footnote 43.
Antoniuk v. Smith, [1930] 2 W.W.R. 721 per Hyndman J.A., at p. 733.
Gibbon v. Harris,supra, footnote 43, per Stuart J.A., at p. 676.
For example, The Chiropody Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 57; The Optometry Act,
R.S.O. 1960, c.283.
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conditions of entrance into a particular school. It is submitted that the
Alberta court in the Gibbons case49 equated the diagnosing skill of a
chiropractor to that of a physician. It would therefore logically follow
that if we accept the objective standard of physicians, we should
accept a similar standard for chiropractors in the field of diagnosing
spinal injuries (that being the area of specialization of that particular
school).
The eminent American attorney, Melvin Belli, 50 states that when
practitioners of drugless healing or other members of the unconventional schools of medicine find that the required treatment is beyond
their license or ability, they have a duty to refer their patient to a
qualified doctor. This appears to be sound reasoning and ought to be
adopted in Canada. However, the Ontario High Court in Jarvis v.
InternationalNickel Co. Ltd.5 1 held that a general practitioner is under
no duty to refer his patient to a specialist when he is unable to
diagnose and treat the ailment.
It is a well-known rule of law that a practitioner is required to
attain that degree of skill and care which he expressly or impliedly
represents that he possesses. Therefore, if a layman undertakes a
task requiring the skill and knowledge of a doctor, the layman must
bring to the performance of that task, the skill and knowledge of a
reasonable doctor.5 2 It would appear however that absence of a
53
license to practice is of itself no evidence of lack of skill and care.
An exception to this principle arises when a layman renders aid in
an emergency. In such a situation the layman is expected to possess
the skill and care of the reasonable man. He will be held negligent
where he renders aid or treatment, which he knew or ought to have
known was outside his competence and which resulted in damage.
To be contrasted with the above, is the situation where a person
demands medical or quasi-medical treatment from another who he
knows does not possess the proper qualification to give the treatment
requested. The classic example is of a woman who is injured as a
result of requesting a jeweller to pierce her ears, the injury being
attributable to the improper sterilization of instruments.
In such circumstances,5 4 it has been held that the jeweller must
exhibit the standard of care expected of a reasonable jeweller. If
the lady desired the precautions and techniques employed by a doctor,
she should have visited a doctor.
49 Supra, footnote 43.
50 Melvin Belli, 3 Modern Trials (1954), p. 2009.
51 Supra, footnote 20.
52 For the standard of care for a person who holds himself out to be a
dentist, see R. v. Slavik (1955), 15 W.W.R. 504 (B.C.C.A.).
53 Brown v. Slyne (1926), 242 N.Y. 176 and quoted by Prosser, op. cit.,
supra, footnote 48, p. 132.
54 Phillips v. Win. Whiteley Ltd., [1938] 1 All E.R. 566.
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Specialists
Those who have taken special studies in a particular field of
medicine and who thereby profess to have special skill and training
are called specialists. The Supreme Court of Canada has stated that
a specialist should "possess the skill, knowledge and judgment of the
generality or average of the special group of class of technicians to
which he belongs and will [should] faithfully exercise them." 55 In
other words, the standard of care expected of a specialist is that of
the reasonable doctor who possesses such special knowledge.
There is Canadian authority for the logical proposition that "a
higher standard of care is expected of one who holds himself out to
be a specialist than is expected from a general practitioner." 56 If
this were not so a person with such skill and knowledge would be
judged by a lower standard than the law permits, for a person, who
holds himself out to possess special skill and knowledge, must live up
to the objective standard expected of similar persons with the same
skill and knowledge.
A specialist's standing does not deprive him of the protection of
the rules of law relating to the standard of care. Like the general
practitioner, the specialist is not an insurer.5 7 He does not guarantee
results. As will be pointed out later, the specialist will not be held
liable for a mistake in judgment where he has the exhibited skill, care
and knowledge of a reasonable and similar specialist.5 8 However, a
specialist is an expert in one narrow field. He cannot assume the
duties of a specialist in a different and equally narrow field without
exhibiting the standard of care expected of such a specialist. It has
been suggested that the same standard is expected of a specialist
regardless if he practices in a large city or a small town. 59
By the very nature of their practice, general practitioners infringe upon the fields usually reserved for specialists. It is not an
uncommon practice for a family doctor to remove tonsils or deliver
babies; work reserved to throat specialists and obstetricians respectively. This raises the question whether a general practitioner doing
the work of a specialist should be judged by the standard applicable
to specialists.
The California case of Sinz v. Owens 60 holds that a general practitioner will not be judged by specialists' standards unless the general
practitioner realized or should have realized the skill of a specialist was
required. This case appears to answer the question in a logical fashion.
55 Wilson v. Swanson, supra, footnote 12, per Rand J., at p. 811; Gent cG
Gent v. Wilson, [19561 O.R. 257 (C.A.); Crysler v. Pearse,supra, footnote 20,
per Plaxton J., at p. 543; Prosser, op. cit., supra, footnote 48, p. 132.
56 Mcaffrey v. Hague, [1949] 2 W.W.R. 539, per Campbell J., at p. 542.
57 Wilson v. Swanson, supra, footnote 12.
58 Ibid.

59 E. L. Haines, Courts and Doctors (1952), 32 Can. Bar Rev. 483.

60 (1949), 33 Cal. 2d 749.
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It would not be in the public interest to unduly restrict the work of
our family doctors.
In Ontario there is no duty for the general practitioner to refer
his patient to a specialist. The reason, as stated by Wright J. in
Jarvis v. InternationalNickel Co. Ltd., is that
•.. when the doctor brings to bear upon the treatment of the patient a
reasonable degree of skill and care under all circumstances he has
discharged his duty.61
This proposition does not hold true in other jurisdictions. Mr.
Belli states that a doctor has the legal duty to inform his patient and
advise the services of other doctors if he lacks the skill and knowledge
to treat his patient properly. 62 Indeed, the American position 63 is that
if specialists reside in the area where the doctor practices, it is the
duty of the doctor to possess that degree of skill and learning
ordinarily possessed by such specialists. This would place a higher
standard upon the general practitioner in diagnosing, and as a matter
of prudence, if he wishes to avoid liability he should refer his patient
to a specialist.
It is respectfully submitted that the Jarvis case is bad law. How
can it be said that a doctor "brings to bear upon a patient a reasonable
degree . . . of care" if the doctor knows he is unable to treat his
patient who requires the attention of a specialist? Is it asking too
much of a busy doctor to refer his patient to a specialist? Dean
Meredith strongly advised that if a doctor is uncertain about a case
he should act immediately and consult another practitioner.64 Lord
Nathan doubts that the Jarvis rule would be applied in England. 65
The extra-legal practice of hospitals restricting their facilities to
accredited specialists has the two-fold result of requiring general practitioners to refer to specialists more often thus raising the duty of
care and of confining the general practitioner to office and home treatment.66 It would thus seem to lead to the conclusion that the procedures adopted by the medical profession itself would require a
general practitioner to refer difficult cases to specialists.
It is submitted that the case of Fraserv. The Vancouver General
Hospital 67 would provide judicial authority for a Canadian court to
overrule the Jarvis case. In the Frasercase, a hospital employee (an
intern) failed to read an X-ray properly and as a result of the improper
diagnosis the patient died. The hospital was held liable for negligence
for it should have called in a radiologist to compensate for the intern's
inexperience. If a specialist is needed to diagnose a problem given to
an inexperienced man, it would only seem reasonable that a general
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

Supra, footnote 20, at p. 571.
Belli, op. cit., supra,footnote 50, at p. 2008.
McCoid, op. cit., supra,footnote 17, at pp. 567-568.
Op. cit., supra,footnote 37, at p. 69.
Op. cit., supra,footnote 11, at p. 46.
McCoid, op. cit., supra,footnote 17, at p. 569.
[1952] 2 S.C.R. 36.
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practitioner (lacking expertise in a particular field as an intern does)
should be compelled to refer a problem to a specialist if he realized
or should have realized that the skill of a specialist might be required.
It would also be possible for a Canadian court to confine the
Jarvis case to its own set of facts. It must be remembered, Jarvis
arose in rural Ontario (Copper Cliff) and was decided in 1929 when
there were few specialists. Since 1929, the number of specialists has
risen and better means of communication and transportation are
available today.
Legal Duty
This is no legal duty for a physician to render professional services
if requested to do so. 68 If a contract for professional services can be
proved, the doctor may be found liable for breach of contract if he
failed to render aid upon request. The doctor will assume a duty and
potential tort liability the moment he agrees to treat his patient.
Liability will not be confined to negligence in prescribing drugs, administering treatment, or the management of the patient but will
cover all acts performed by a doctor from the time the patient comes
under his instructions. Thus a doctor has been found negligent where
he failed to set up an X-ray table properly. 69
The doctor's duty to look after his patient remains until, (1) the
patient unilaterally dismisses the doctor; (2) treatment is no longer
required°; (3) the doctor-patient relationship is dissolved by mutual
consent; or (4) the doctor gives his patient reasonable notice and an
opportunity to retain a new physician.
A doctor is unable to devote his constant attention to his patient.
However, liability will be imposed upon a doctor if the lack of attention
leads to an "avoidable deterioration of the patient's condition". 71 A
doctor may be found negligent in not attending his patient properly. 72
Regard must be had to the nature of the situations and previous commitments incurred by the doctor. The test is reasonableness in the
circumstances. This may be illustrated by examining the case of
Smith v. Rae.73 In that case a doctor was summoned to attend the
delivery of his patient's baby. The doctor arrived late, and in the
interim, the patient died. It was held that the doctor was not negligent
because the critical condition of the mother had not been communicated to him and the delivery was not expected at that particular
hour.
68 Hurley v. Eddingfield (1901), 156 Ind. 416.

69 Baltzan v. Fidelity Insurance Co., [19321 3 W.W.R. 140; aff'd. [19331 3
W.W.R. 203.
70 Tadlock v. Lloyd (1918), 65 Colo. 40 "when a physician makes no effort
to inform himself of the condition of his patient or the progress of his malady,
he will be liable if unforeseen damages occur." See Belli, op. cit., supra,
footnote 50, pp. 2007-2008.
71 Lord Nathan, op. cit., supra, footnote 11, p. 42.
72 Ball v. Howard, 1 Lancet (1924), p. 253, quoted by Lord Nathan, ibid.
73 (1919), 46 O.L.R. 518 (Ont. C.A.).

1966]

The Standardof Care in Malpractice Cases

A doctor has been found negligent in failing to tell his replacement the extent of the patient's condition. 74 A doctor will not be held
liable if he failed to supervise routine matters such as those performed
by hospital attendants upon or for his patient. 5
Diagnosis
The doctor-patient relationship usually commences as the doctor
begins his diagnosis. The case law indicates that a doctor should have

a reasonable opportunity for examining the patient and he should
exercise ordinary care and diligence in discovering the nature of the
ailment or injury. Failure to exercise care and diligence in diagnosis
76
will render the doctor liable for negligence.
This does not mean however that a doctor will be liable if he
made a wrong or mistaken diagnosis. In Wilson v. Swanson, a doctor
mistakenly diagnosed his patient's illness as cancer. During a subsequent operation, the doctor removed what he thought to be cancerous
organs. Further tests revealed that the patient did not suffer from
cancer. The patient sued. In the Supreme Court of Canada, Rand J.
stated:
In a given situation some may differ from others in that exercise [of
skill, knowledge and judgment] depending on the significance they
attribute to the different factors in the light of their own experience. The
dynamics of the human body of each individual are themselves individual
and there are lines of doubt and uncertainty at which a clear course of
action may be precluded.
An error in judgment has long been distinguished from an act of
unskillfulness or carelessness or due to lack of knowledge. In such a
situation a decision must be made without delay based on limited known
and unknown factors; and the honest and intelligent exercise of judgment has long been recognized as satisfying the professional obligation.77
Implicit in these remarks is the proposition that the treatment prescribed by the doctor cannot be condemned because somebody of per78
haps greater skill would have pursued another course.
An X-ray machine is a great aid in diagnosis. A doctor need not
take an X-ray in every case, otherwise years of study and experience
would be cast aside as negligible. 79 Factors to be considered include
74 Farquhar v. Murray (1901), 3 F. (Ct. of Sessions) 859, as quoted by
Lord Nathan, op. cit., supra,footnote 11, p. 42.
75 Burden v. Harbourview Hospital, [1947] 2 D.L.R. 338 (N.S.S.C.);
Hewitson v. Hassard (1916), 10 W.W.R. 1088 (Man. C.A.); Morris v. WinsburyWhite [1937] 4 All E.R. 494.
79' Gibbons v. Harris, supra, footnote 43; Stamper v. Rhindress, supra,
footnote 20; Mitchell v. Dixon, [1914] App. D. 519 (South Africa) as quoted by
Nathan, op. cit., supra, footnote 11, p. 44; Fortnerv. Koch (1935), 272 Mich.
273, as quoted by Belli, op. cit., supra, footnote 50, p. 2006. See also Meredith,
op. cit., supra, footnote 37, p. 63.
77 Supra, footnote 12; Waldon v. Archer, supra, footnote 12; Hamilton v.
Phoenix Lumber Co. Ltd., [1931] 1 W.W.R. 43; see generally, Meredith, op. cit.,
supra, footnote 37, p. 53.
78 Hodgins v. Banting (1906), 12 O.L.R. 117.
79 Moore & Moore v. Large, [1932] 2 W.W.R. 568 (B.C.C.A.); Armstrong
v. Dawson, [1933] 1 W.W.R. 187 (Sask. C.A.).
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the patient's condition, 8the
character of the injuries and the avail0
ability of the apparatus.
Duty to Follow Medical Developments
Since a skilful diagnosis obviously depends upon the skill, care
and knowledge of the doctor, a doctor should take reasonable steps to
keep abreast of the times.8 1 As far back as 1853, it was pointed out
that the standard of ordinary skill is on the advance and "he who
would not be found wanting, must apply himself with all diligence to
the most accredited sources of knowledge. '8 2 Although liability will
arise if a doctor fails to keep abreast, he will not be held liable because
he failed to read an article published a year ago and which might have
warned him of the existence of risks he would have encountered in
the treatment rendered. As Denning L.J. (as he then was) stated:
"It would place too high a burden on a medical man to say he must
read every article in the medical press."8 3 A doctor will not be deemed
to be negligent for failing to use apparatus which was rare and unavailable. 84 Assuming the diligent doctor has kept abreast of the latest
medical techniques and as a result of such diligence the doctor uses
a new instrument, what standard of care will the law demand? There
is Canadian authority for the proposition that where the properties of
the treatment are not fully known or understood the doctor must
use "very great care and failure in that regard is negligence". 85 It is
submitted that where the new instrument or new treatment pattern
has been thoroughly tested the practitioner should familiarize himself with the instrument or treatment pattern and he would be
expected to use only a reasonable amount of care.
Experimentation
It is possible that a doctor might develop his own new techniques
and wish to experiment on his patient. It has been suggested that a
doctor may "innovate somewhat ... if it was done for the benefit of
the patient after the established methods of treatment have proven
86
unsuccessful".
In the recent case of Male v. Hopmans,8 7 after previous methods of
treatment proved unsuccessful, the defendant doctor administered an
antibiotic, "Neomycin", for nineteen days, despite warnings from the
manufacturer that neomycin treatment should not continue past ten
days. The drug manufacturer also warned against renal and auditory
80 Sabapathi v. Huntley, [1937] 1 W.W.R. 817 (P.C.); Clark v. Wansbrough, supra, footnote 20.
81 Nathan, op. cit., supra, footnote 11, pp. 27-28; Meredith, op. cit., supra,
footnote 37, p. 85; Haines, op. cit., supra,footnote 62, p. 485.
82 Mcandless v. McWha (1853), 22 Pa. (10 Harris) 261, at p. 269 as
quoted by McCoid, op. cit., supra, footnote 17, p. 575.
83 Crawford v. Charing Cross, as quoted by Nathan, op. cit., supra, footnote 11, p. 27.
84 Whiteford v. Hunter, supra, footnote 14.
85 Baills v. Boulanger, [1924] 4 O.C.R. 1083.
86 MoCoid, op. cit., supra, footnote 17, p. 583.
87 As yet unreported, December 7, 1965. (Ont. H.C.).
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side-effects. The doctor was aware of these warnings yet he continued
to give treatment without making use of the equipment available in
order to check against the possible renal and auditory consequences.
It subsequently developed that the plaintiff (patient) became almost
totally deaf as a result of taking the neomycin. The patient sued and
recovered damages from the defendant doctor. During the course of
judgment Gale C.J.H.C. stated:
•

. .

In conducting a new and dangerous course of treatment for the

*

. .

It was incumbent upon Dr. Hopmans, having once determined to

first time, [the doctor] neglected to take the elementary precautions of
which he was admittedly aware to prevent the result which actually
occurred.

embark upon an admittedly radical programme of treatment, to exert
the utmost for the safety of his patient.

To be contrasted with the above, is the situation wherein a doctor
experiments without knowing any of the possible consequences. A
doctor will be88 found liable if his experimentation amounted to a
"rash action".
The courts distinguish between experimenting with
a new and untried technique and the "utilization of a new advance
which carries with it unforeseen dangers and difficulties". 89 It would
thus seem that liability will be imposed upon a doctor at the line
which the court draws between initiative and experimentation. The
courts must develop a policy in this regard which will not stifle
initiative and discourage advances in techniques while keeping to the
fore the health and safety of the patient.
Delegation of Duties
During the course of the doctor-patient relationship, it will often
be necessary for the doctor to delegate duties. A doctor cannot delegate responsibility to another doctor where the patient has not consented.9 0 If the patient is to appoint an assistant doctor, and the doctor
instead appoints his own assistant, the patient will not be responsible
for paying the assistant's fees.91 It has long been held that a doctor
will be vicariously liable for the negligence of his "apprentices", 92
interns and students, 93 and servants (technicians and nurses).94 A
chief surgeon will not be vicariously liable for the negligence of
doctors who are assisting at an operation where the presence and
participation of such assistants are proper and the assistants are duly
qualified, possessing the skill and experience necessary for the work
entrusted to them.9 5
88 Slater v. Baker (1767), 95 E.R. 860. See also Halushka v. University of
Saskatchewan (1966), 53 D.L.R. (2d) 436 (Sask. C.A.).
89 Nathan, op. cit., supra,footnote 11, p. 28.
90 Burk v. Starr [1952) 1 D.L.R. 317 (B.C.S.C.).
91 Lindsay v. Freda (1923), 56 N.S.R. 210.
92 Hancke v. Hooper (1835), 7 C. & P. 81, 173 E.R. 37.
93 McNamarav. Smith, [1934] O.R. 249 (C.A.).
94 AbeZ v. Cooke, [1938] 1 D.L.R. 170; Hochman v. Willensky, [1933]
O.W.N. 78.

95 McFadyen v. Harvie, [1941] O.R. 90; [1942] S.C.R. 39.
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In delegating duties to the patient or his family the doctor should
give clear and unambiguous instructions, explaining what is to be
expected of them and, furthermore, he should warn of any foreseeable and serious consequence. The extent of such delegation depends
upon the nature of the risk involved, the patient's condition and the
ability to adequately comprehend the instructions given. For example,
in Marshall v. Rogers, 96 a doctor drastically reduced his patient's insulin requirements while putting the patient on a rigid diet. This was an
admittedly dangerous course of treatment. The doctor was held
negligent in delegating to the patient the duty of deciding from his
subjective symptoms, without daily tests by the physician, what his
real condition was. But where a doctor delegated the task of administering heat treatments (wrapped warmed bricks) to members of
the patient's family, and the patient was subsequently burned as a
result of the heat treatment, the doctor was found not negligent in
delegating duties which required no special knowledge or skill.97
Duty to Inform
It was well-established 8 that a doctor has a duty to inform and
warn his patient of all the pertinent facts of the case. Failure to do
so might constitute a lack of consent and the doctor might be liable
for technical assault, or trespass as well as for negligence. The duty
to inform does not arise if the patient does not wish to be informed,
if he is incapable of understanding the true significance of the treatment about to be undertaken or if he is of unsound mind. 99
A doctor is under no obligation to describe in great detail all the
possible consequences of the treatment to be rendered, nor is he under
a duty to warn his patient of risks which are inherent or obvious.
In Murrin v. Janes'00 the patient alleged his dentist was negligent in
failing to warn of the consequences of excessive blood loss following
an extraction. The dentist was found not negligent as "any adult of
sound mind must be considered to be aware of the danger of continued loss of blood".
Failure to warn may be a cause of action in itself. Furthermore,
it might be sufficient to prevent the limitation period (one year) from
running if such failure amounted to fraudulent concealment. Finally,
it might be relevant in cases involving claims for unauthorized treatment or assault.
American authority 01 indicates that a physician has an obligation
to disclose to his patient the fact that the treatment which he has
96 [19431 2 W.W.R. 545; Ball v. Howard, supra, footnote 75.
97 Marchandv. Bertrand (1911), 39 S.C. 49 as quoted by Meredith, op. cit.,
supra, footnote 37, p. 88; see also Nathan, op. cit., supra, footnote 11, p. 47.
98 Since 1767, Slater v. Baker, supra, footnote 91; Kenny v. Lockwood,
[19321 O.R.141.
99 See generally, Meredith, op. cit., supra, footnote 37, p. 88 ff.; Male v.
Hopeman, supra,footnote 87.
100 (1949), 23 M.P.R. 377 (Nfld.).
101 Kelly v. Carroll (1950), 212 P. 2d 658; Baldour v. Rogers (1955), So.
2d 658, as quoted by McCoid, op. cit., supra, footnote 17, p. 572.

1966]

The Standardof Care in MalpracticeCases

237

undertaken is not effective or will not be effective. No such duty
exists in Ontario. 10 2 It is submitted that the Ontario courts ought to
follow the American position. However a doctor may deliberately
tell his patient a falsehood concerning the state of his patient's
truth would
health, if in the exercise of his professional judgment the
03
have an adverse effect upon the health of the patient.
In Furniss v. Fitchett10 4 a husband instructed his family doctor
to write a medical report on his medically unstable wife. One year
after the husband received the report, in an application for maintenance hearing, counsel for the husband confronted the wife with the
medical report. The wife, hitherto ignorant of the report, suffered
shock as a result of reading the report and sued the doctor. The court,
in holding for the wife, stated that a doctor's duty of care to his
patient involved a duty not to give a third party a report concerning
the patient, if it was reasonably foreseeable that the report would
come to the patient's attention and cause her physical harm. Professor
Fleming has criticised this decision as inconsistent with the cases
allowing recovery for mental shock.105 Certainly one ought not to
recover for suffering nervous shock as a result of reading the truth
about one's self. This decision places an additional burden upon the
doctor's shoulders. It might also hinder parents and spouses from
receiving confidential information about their immediate family.
In the recent case of Smitk v. Auckland HospitalBoard'0 6 a doctor
was held liable for negligently informing his patient about the nature
of the risk involved in the pattern of treatment the doctor hoped to
follow. The New Zealand court laid down no general rule as to what
a doctor should tell his patient but based its decision upon the specific
inquiry of the patient regarding the risk.
The specific inquiry transformed the legal situation for it then
becomes the doctor's duty, if he embarked on any answer at all, to give
a careful answer, not merely to offer reassurances, however well-intentioned.107
Turner J. stated that a doctor must use due care in answering his
patient's questions, "where the patient to the knowledge of the doctor
intends to place reliance on that answer in making a decision as to
08
In
the treatment or procedure to which he is asked to consent".
0 9 Gale C.J.H.C. held that in the circumstances of the
Male v. Hopmans'
case (the patient being too ill and unable to comprehend the significance of the course of treatment planned), failure to warn the patient
did not constitute negligence. In addition, the learned Chief Justice
See Jarvis v. InternationalNickel Co. Ltd., supra, footnote 20.
Hatcher v. Black (1954) Times (London) July 2 as quoted by Nathan,
op. cit., supra, footnote 11, p. 50.
104 [19581 N.Z.L.R. 398.
105 Fleming, op. cit., supra, footnote 31, pp. 643-644.
106 [19641 N.Z.L.R. 241; reversed [1965] N.Z.L.R. 191.
107 Quoted by Mathieson, What Should a Doctor Tell a Patient (1965), 28
M.L.R. 595.
108 Ibid.
109 Supra, footnote 87.
102
103
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held that, "there is no evidence to show that Dr. Hopman's failure to
explain all of the attendant risks at the time the plaintiff asked about
the warning on the bottle was an effective cause of the damage which
was done to him".
It has been suggested o that a doctor should not be obliged to
elaborate upon the risk in great detail. It would be undesirable to
compel doctors to discuss possibilities, under the apprehension of
liability for negligence, should things go wrong. Thus, the court's
action in limiting liability to specific requests seems logical.
The duty to warn should be measured by the same standard and
upon the same principles applicable to technique. This is subject to
the qualification that the "patient must realize, like all of us, there
can be no part of medical practice which is infallable; contingencies
are inseparable from human affairs." ' ' This is consistent with the
rules of law which state that a doctor does not guarantee his patient's
recovery and will not be liable for a mistake in judgment if the mistake
was made while exercising proper skill, care and knowledge.
Doctors are obliged to make reports and keep certain records for
the purposes of the federal and provincial governments' 1 2 and failure
to report in certain circumstances will result in criminal prosecution." 3 As a result of the Smith"4 case the Crown might have an
additional remedy (a civil suit) against the doctor. Liability would
result if it can be proven that the negligent statement of the doctor
detrimentally affected a course of action adopted by the government,
which was based on the doctor's report.
A doctor's conduct may be so negligent as to render the doctor
liable for criminal negligence under s. 191 of the Criminal Code of
Canada." 5 To convict a doctor of criminal negligence
it must be shown that his negligence or incompetence showed a disregard
for the life and safety of his patient as to 6amount to a crime against
the state and conduct deserving punishment."
Evaluating the Standard of Care
The standard of care expected of medical practitioners is difficult
to assess and cannot be considered in isolation. Many factors have to
be taken into account. A standard of care would be irrelevant and
would be nothing more than some philosophic absolute if it was
impossible to prove a departure therefrom. Of what use is a standard
of care if doctors refuse to give the same objective evidence in a
malpractice suit (where a doctor's conduct is at issue) as they would
10 Supra, footnote 107, p. 597.
111 Ibid., p. 599.

112 See generally, Cherniak, Statutory Enactments Relating to Hospitals,
Doctors, Dentists and Pharmacists (1963) Special lecture series, Law Society
of Upper Canada, p. 101.
113 See generally, R. v. Gordon (1923), 54 O.L.R. 355, Mens res necessary.
114 Supra, footnote 106.
"5 S.C. 1953-54, c. 51.
116 1k. v. Giardine, supra, footnote 20, per Dacy Co. Ct. J., at p. 300.
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give in a case involving personal injury (where a doctor's conduct is
not being assessed)? In addition to the evidentiary problem, the
social problem must be assessed. A patient in trying to prove negligence is faced with complex, uncertain and expensive litigation. An
impecunious patient just cannot afford to sue his doctor. Neither a
rich nor a poor patient will recover if the doctor is impecunious or
uninsured. Therefore, the standard of care is not the isolated
consideration.
There is a diversity of opinion as to the effectiveness of the
present laws relating to medical malpractice. Professor A. A. Ehrenzweig states that
...

both patient and those entrusted with his care are poorly served by

the present rules relating to liability for medical malpractice."17

On the other hand, the Attorney-General's (Ontario) Report
states: It can hardly be said that the law as now administered in
Ontario is in any sense burdensome. 118 The Commissioners and other
Ontario writers indicate that the real safeguard in present Ontario
law is that malpractice actions are tried before a judge without a
jury. This practice precludes plaintiff's counsel from adopting overlyemotional trial techniques designed to sway a lay jury. The rule
forbidding contingency fees keeps our courts from being burdened
with a multiplicity of negligence cases, and reduces the size of damage
awards. It is apparent that the problem of medical malpractice is
more serious in the United States than in any of the Canadian
jurisdictions.
The present standard of care is based primarily upon the customary practice of doctors in cases and in circumstances similar to
the one on trial. This means that expert evidence is used in assessing
the standard of care. Custom became the standard of care for two
reasons, one historical, the other practical. In the days before the
present objective standard was developed, the courts imposed liability
upon those who held themselves out to the public as possessing special
knowledge and skill. Secondly, custom was adopted because it was
thought the lay jury and the bench would be unable adequately to
comprehend and evaluate the professional conduct of a doctor. Today,
customary practice provides a convenient measure or guide for the
trial judge to follow. The judge is not compelled to accept the established practice of doctors as proof of the issue. The professional standard is disregarded when the trial judge considers the customary
practice to be careless. Thus, judicial policy and discretion precludes
the imposition by the medical profession of its own uncontrolled
standards to the detriment of the public. However, because the courts,
in most cases, accept customary practice in assessing the doctor's
conduct, the doctor is thereby reassured that his conduct is being
117 Ehrenzweig, Hospital Accident Insurance: A Needed First Step Towards the Displacement of Liability for Medical Malpractice, 31 U. of
Chicago L.R. 279.
118 Op. cit., supra, footnote 1, p. 82.
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judged by his professional brethren. This means that the question
of liability will not be left to one who has no medical training. Customary practice also prevents an arbitrary and shifting standard from
being set. Otherwise a doctor would be more interested in protecting
himself from liability than in the welfare of his patient. Initiative
would be stifled. A happy balance must be reached between a doctor
being overly cautious and not cautious enough. The present standard
of care provides the means of achieving this happy balance.
The general duty to use skill and care is composed of many small
but important duties.'1 9 To illustrate, a doctor owes a duty to inform
his patient, to exercise skill 'and care in diagnosis and in rendering
treatment. If the doctor fails to use reasonable care in the performance of any of these duties, he will automatically be in breach
of the general duty. The multi-duty theory affords the patient additional protection because each act is independently evaluated. The
general standard of care will not be attained until each specific duty
has been assessed and found to be correct.
Three additional courses could be pursued by the courts in assessing professional standards. The courts could abolish the professional
standard and replace it with the ordinary objective standard of the
layman. This approach would run contrary to history and precedent.
It would only result in injustices to both doctors and their patients.
Confidence and initiative would be lost and this, in turn, would result
in a deterioration of professional competence. Such an approach is
untenable.
The courts could use the doctrine of strict liability. Strict liability is applied by the courts in cases involving dangerous and
abnormal activity. Medical practice cannot be classified as such.
Imposition of strick liability would place an unfair burden upon the
medical profession. Doctors would be found liable for conduct that
is both safe and normal if the patient suffers.
Finally, the court could adopt the theory of negligence without
fault which seems to be the trend in tort law today. The effect of
such a course is to place less emphasis upon the admonitory and
deterrent theory of tort law and place more emphasis upon the compensation of victims. Under this scheme, a patient would receive
compensation regardless of fault. This is usually accomplished by
providing a scheme of insurance analogous to workmen's compensation. The whole segment of an industry, both employers and employees, or doctors and patients, bear the responsibility for compensation. Professor Ehrenzweig advocates such a scheme 120 for the limited
area of hospital liability for the torts of their doctors and technical
personnel. Professor Ehrenzweig states that his plan would provide
for the assurance and easy determination of equal minimum awards
and would eliminate the threats, gambles, stigmas and expenses
119 See generally, Mathieson, op. cit., supra,footnote 109.

120 Ehrenzweig, op. cit., supra,footnote 118.

The Standardof Care in MalpracticeCases

1966]

attached to litigation. Furthermore, it would promote care and safety.
The physician would be relieved of concern which impairs the
progress and effectiveness of medical practice.
Conclusion
The law of professional negligence stands in contrast to the
tendency favouring the collectivisit principle of loss distribution.
The fault theory, with admonishing and deterring functions, predominates despite universal liability insurance. As Professor Fleming
states:
Liability insurance fails to eliminate the punitive sanctions of an adverse
judgment because it cannot afford protection against inevitable damage
to professional standing. In consequence the law of negligence still
performs in this context the task of controlling conduct and cannot afford
to yield readily to the pressures which elsewhere have
2 led to a decline
in moral fault as a significant determinant of liability.1 1
The close association arising by virtue of the doctor-patient
relationship necessitates adherence to the fault theory of tort law.
If the loss distribution theory were applied to doctors, there would
inevitably follow a deterioration of the doctor-patient relationship.
Consequently, "courts have shown little inclination to condone attenuations of the fault requirement owing to the repercussions of adverse
verdicts on the reputation and future of professional defendants."' 122
It is the constant threat of a malpractice suit that keeps the
medical standard of care high. The professional standard as applied by
our courts does not seem to have impeded medical progress. Professor
Ehrenzweig's concern that the present rules impede progress seems to
be of little consequence when one considers the tremendous advances
in medical science in recent years.
Professor A. H. McCoid 123 in referring to the loss distribution of
tort law and medical malpractice points out that the cost of medical
service is not distributed on a pro rata basis. Patients with adequate
resources will compensate for the loss of fees sustained in administering to charity or "reduced-fee" patients. Distribution of loss is
unlikely to be equal or related to the risk to the individual patient.
Liability in malpractice cases involves more than loss distribution for
a doctor who is sued for malpractice immediately comes under suspicion. Unless the present standard of care and customary practice are
retained, loss distribution principles would have a tendency to undermine public confidence in the medical profession.
Professional negligence is a constantly recurring theme in the
popular press, radio and television. The public is becoming increasingly aware of the problem of medical malpractice. This, in turn, can
only remind a doctor that his conduct is being publicly analysed. A
doctor is forced by public pressure into adopting safe and reasonable
121 Fleming, op. cit., supra,footnote 31, p. 634.
122

Ibid.

123 McCoid, op. cit., supra,footnote 17, p. 609.
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practices. Furthermore, the annual average award for damages incurred in a malpractice suit is approximately $30,000 per year. In a
pamphlet sent to doctors, the Canadian Medical Protective Association
states that for the past fourteen years a total of $418,000 was paid out
in damages and $229,000 was paid out in legal fees.
The present law relating to the standard of care in medical cases
appears adequate and ought to be retained since it protects both
doctors and patients. Apparently society does not demand, nor does it
seem practical, for loss distribution principles to be applied to medical
malpractice cases. Few malpractice cases get to trial. The amount
paid out each year in compensation under the present system is very
small. Threats to initiate a malpractice suit usually mean a quick
and quiet settlement. Finally, the excessive publicity given to the
subject of medical malpractice will keep the standard of care high.
A doctor loses much if he loses his reputation!

